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Book Note

ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION, by John O McGinnis and
Michael B Rappaport1
STACEY DANIS
ORIGINALISM—THE VIEW THAT THE CONSTITUTION should be interpreted

according to its original meaning at the time it was enacted2—is an important,
albeit highly controversial, principle of constitutional interpretation. In
Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport
present a new normative defence of constitutional originalism that connects
this interpretive method directly to the concept of a good constitution. Their
innovative—and at times provocative—defence confronts the fundamental
challenges that continue to plague originalism: does originalism perpetuate the
dead hand of the past? How can the original meaning be justified, given that
African Americans and women were excluded from the enactment of the Constitution in 1787? How can originalism be reconciled with two hundred years
worth of non-originalist precedent?
In chapters one and two, the authors set the groundwork for their normative
defence of constitutional originalism. Their framework, premised on a welfare
consequentialist approach to constitutional interpretation, is simple: the
beneficence of the Constitution is connected to the supermajoritarian process
from which it arose.3 Accordingly, an originalist interpretation is appropriate
1.
2.
3.

(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013) 298 pages.
Ibid at 1.
Ibid at 3.
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because it captures the meaning that passed through the supermajoritarian
process. As such, the results generated by originalism are likely to be beneficial.
In chapter three, the authors conclude that supermajority rule is superior
to majority rule. Supermajority rule creates consensus, fosters non-partisan
participation, and generates a veil of ignorance that helps promote and better
protect minority rights.4 Chapter four illustrates the ways in which the US
Constitution is consistent with supermajority rules. In particular, the authors
highlight the symmetry between the process used to enact the original constitution5 and the process used to enact subsequent constitutional amendments,6
both of which are supermajoritarian in nature. Notably, the current amendment
process allows each generation to import its own values into the Constitution.
McGinnis and Rappaport use this feature of the amendment process to counter
the oft-cited criticism that originalism permits the “dead hand of the past to
control the present.”7
In chapter five, the authors contend that using the amendment process to
update the Constitution is superior to relying on judicial updating. In chapter
six, the authors explicitly address the three greatest failures of the supermajoritarian process: the exclusion of African Americans and women from the original
process of constitutional enactment and the enfranchisement only of states, not
citizens, to enact the Constitution and subsequent amendments.8 The authors
canvass three plausible solutions. Owing to the fact that these failures have, in
large part, since been rectified through constitutional amendments, the authors
conclude that the most optimal solution is to follow the good, albeit imperfect,
US Constitution.9
The first half of this book focuses on the authors’ normative defence of
originalism. Chapters seven and eight fill in the positive content of originalism by
showing that the enactors interpreted the Constitution according to the applicable

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ibid at 33-61.
US Const art V. The requirements imposed under Article V amount to a double
supermajority requirement.
US Const art VII.
Supra note 1 at 77.
Ibid at 100.
See US Const amend XIII, XIV, XV, XIX. The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery, the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state infringement of civil rights, and the Fifteenth
Amendment forbade racial discrimination in the protection of voting rights. The Nineteenth
Amendment guaranteed women the right to vote, ensuring that women from that time
forward could fully participate in the constitutional amendment process.
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originalist interpretive rules of the time. Consequently, the actual meaning of the
Constitution requires an application of these original interpretive methods.
In chapters nine and ten, McGinnis and Rappaport challenge the notion that
originalism is inconsistent with precedent.10 They propose an optimal doctrine
of constitutional precedent, which, generally speaking, dictates that precedent
should be respected in two cases: when overruling it would result in enormous
costs and when the precedent is entrenched and thus likely to be re-enacted via
constitutional amendment.11
The authors conclude their defence of originalism by envisioning a world
where originalism is the dominant view of constitutional jurisprudence. It is
suggested that, only then, can we achieve “law that is enduring and objective,
law that is of high quality, and law that is subject to revision by the people of
each generation.”12 Overall, McGinnis and Rappaport successfully temper some
of originalism’s strongest discontents. They offer a comprehensive defence of
originalism that reflects the complex intricacies underlying modern constitional
interpretation. This book, applicable to both Americans and Canadians alike,
stands as an important contribution to the literature on originalism and the
growing debate over constitutional interpretation.

10. Supra note 1 at 156. Gary Lawson was among the first to argue that originalism is
inconsistent with precedent. Lawson’s argument remains one of the most powerful and
persuasive. See Gary Lawson, “The Constitutional Case Against Precedent” (1994) 17:1
Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 23. See also Gary Lawson, “Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against
Precedent Revisited” 5:1 Ave Maria L Rev 1.
11. Supra note 1 at 179-85.
12. Ibid at 197.

